Since taking over as Twins GM, Bill Smith has had something of a roller coaster ride.  He inherited a bad situation in which watched the franchise player walk away for basically nothing and traded the best pitcher in baseball at the time for a track runner and a bag of chips.  Some of that was forgivable, but the real killer was the Matt Garza/Delmon Young trade, which saw Tampa Bay acquire two players who have been instrumental in their success (plus a minor leaguer) in exchange for three players who, until this year, hardly did anything of value for the Twins.  Smith, of course, went on tear as GM, making multiple savvy moves:  Cabrera, Rauch and Pavano last year, and adding Hudson, Thome, and JJ Hardy this year. Delmon Young suddenly turning into a top 25 hitter seemed to be the icing on the cake:  Smith was on an absolute roll.

Then, this.

My reaction to the Capps/Ramos trade wasn’t my most thoughtful, reasonable, level-headed moment.  It went something like… “WTF YOU HAVE GOT TO BE SH!++!N& ME!!!  Wilson RAMOS…for a good (but not great reliever), and we had to add a THROW-IN?!?!?  ARRRRGH!”  The move is certainly frustrating when taking the long-view, but in the short term, it’s beneficial.

Capps helps  THIS team THIS year. Ramos wouldn’t help them this year, or any time soon.  That in and of itself takes some of the sting out. While the Twins probably should have gotten more for Ramos, the bottom line is they had very little use for him.  Losing him as a player doesn’t hurt; losing him as an asset does.

Capps certainly makes this team better and helps the bullpen.  In fact, his benefit to the bullpen might be even greater than anticipated.  Many writers are claiming that Capps is simply Jon Rauch with a mid-90’s fastball.  That claim is over-simplified. Capps walks fewer batters and strikes out more batters.  At least this year, he has increased his groundball rate to almost 50%, while Rauch remains a flyball pitcher. Furthermore, while Capps allows a perfectly average percentage of home runs, Rauch has an unsustainably-low home run rate that is bound to regress as the season goes on. The upgrade to Capps over Rauch’s likely regression is large:  Given that Rauch allows so many flyballs in the first place, his regression on home run rate could very well have a large impact on his overall performance. Capps doesn’t look like he’s due for a regression. As far as the closer is concerned, this is an upgrade.

There is also the indirect benefit to the bullpen.  As Aaron Gleeman pointed out back on July 12, one of Rauch’s biggest assets is his durability, and that asset has not been utilized at all since moving to the closer role. Moving Rauch out of the closer role and into a setup role should mean more innings for Rauch and less work for Jesse Crain, Matt Guerrier, and Jose Mijares.  Basically, trading for Capps allows the Twins to inject into their middle-to-late relief core a guy who can be counted on to go for more than one inning frequently.

The benefits of the Capps trade come down to this:  He’s an upgrade in the closer spot over Rauch, and, by moving Rauch into a middle relief/setup role, he gives the Twins a durable arm to spread the workload of getting from the starter to the closer.  That should help this team win this year, and that’s something that a lot of fans have been clamoring for this team to do for a long time:  sacrifice some long-term stability for a chance to put yourself over the top.

Of course, this isn’t THAT big of a move. Part of what makes this move sting so much is that, no more than a month ago, Ramos was rumored to be the centerpiece of a deal for Cliff Lee. The truth is, though, that the Twins just couldn’t have made the kind of offer that Texas did. Justin Smoak is a switch-hitting power hitter who is just about major-league ready and was ranked the 13th best overall prospect in America this last spring.  Ramos was ranked number 58.  Given what the Mariners ended up getting (and almost got) for Lee, it’s clear that a package headlined by Ramos was never going to get that deal done.

Ramos is a very, very good talent, but he hasn’t done the Twins any favors in terms of keeping up his value. After hitting .288/.346/.434 in 126 games for Fort Meyers in 2008, Ramos missed significant playing time in 2009 due to injury, and has struggled mightily at AAA in 2010, batting only .241/.280/.345 while fighting through some minor injuries. His value was probably as low as it could be.

This, though, is where my biggest beef with this trade comes in.  If Ramos’ value was at its lowest, why trade him now? There was certainly no harm in letting him play every day at AAA with the hope that he could increase his trade value. Even with his struggles this year and moderate injury history, a stretch of good play should have gotten the Twins more than one above-average reliever, one who, by the way, was available for basically nothing at the start of the year. Had the Twins exercised a little more foresight and gotten bullpen help at the start of the year, this move would have been unnecessary.

To sum up:  Capps undoubtedly helps the bullpen this year.  I think he’s more of an upgrade at closer than most are assuming. Capps also makes the bullpen deeper and more durable, since his acquisition will move Rauch into a setup role.  However, to get him, the Twins sold as low as they could have on a very good (but maybe not great) prospect.  This is a good move for the 2010 team. It’s a pretty lousy move for the organization as a whole. Grade: C

Posted in Roster Moves No Comments Tags: Bill Smith, Matt Capps, Wilson Ramos

Rough week for the local nine.  Just when it seemed like the Twins were doomed to face a sweep at the hands of the Phightin’ Phils, Joe Mauer hit a clutch, game-tying home run in the ninth inning, Jim Thome and Drew Butera each went deep in pinch hit at bats, and the Twins rallied for a dramatic win Saturday in Philadelphia.  Carl Pavano followed that up with perhaps his best performance as a Twin, and the Twins unexpectedly took two of three in Philly . . . only to follow that up by dropping a total stink bomb in Milwaukee, getting swept by a team that seemingly has no interest in being relevant.

The frustration of the Milwaukee series was only compounded by the fact that the White Sox and Tigers continue to eat into a division lead that for most of the season has seemed safe.   The Sox have won eleven straight to pull within two games, and the Tigers are 7-3 over their last ten to have closed the gap to a half game. This has led some to act as if the sky is falling over Target Field. Fans, take a deep breath, crack open a beer, smile, chill out, and/or just relax.  There is no reason to panic (at least as far as the division is concerned).

There’s a simple reason not to worry that the Twins are in any danger of actually losing control of the division:  run differential.  A closer look at the standings shows that, while the Twins have outscored their opponents by 46 runs this year, the Tigers have outscored their opponents by only two, and the Sox, owners of that impressive eleven game win streak, have actually been outscored by their opponents by three runs.  Obviously, a season is decided by wins and losses and not by run differential, but run differential can give a good clue as to how well a team can be expected to perform, and this much is clear:  the Sox and Tiger records are well-above their expected performance.

Over at the indispensable baseball-reference.com, one can easily access a handy, under-used statistic called “Pythagorean Win/Loss,” which calculates “expected” winning percentage by virtue of run differential. I won’t bore you with the technicalities, but the idea is simple enough:  by comparing the runs scored against total runs allowed and scored, one can estimate a team’s record. Generally, by season’s end, the Pythagorean W/L matches a team’s actual record pretty closely.  Consider the Twins’, Tigers’, and Sox’s Pythagorean W/L records (or “expected records”):

Twins:  41-31 (40-32 actual)

Tigers:  36-35 (39-32 actual)

White Sox:  35-36 (37-34 actual)

These differences don’t look all that significant, but the point is to realize how far off the Tigers and Sox are already playing.  A two-three game differential over 71 games is a 4.5-7 game differential over the course of a full season.   The takeaway is that, if the teams keep scoring runs and allowing runs at roughly the rate they have been, it’s likely that the Sox and Tigers won’t be able to keep up their current winning percentage and will regress toward their expected winning percentage (about .500). The Twins, for their part, may increase their’s, albeit slightly. (Of course, they could increase it by a LOT if they make a trade for a certain record-pace pitcher.)

Expected W/L certainly isn’t perfect. The 2002 Twins are an example of an extreme outlier, finishing 8 games above their expected W/L (86-75 Expected/94-67 Actual).  It’s probably worth considering, though, that the 2002 Twins were the squad that actually earned the franchise reputation for doing the little things right; perhaps this allowed them to steal an inordinate number of games with smart, scrappy play. That squad also played in an extremely weak division, which might have made it easier for them to outrun their expected win/loss for a full season. Because neither the Tigers nor the Sox are particularly adept at “the small things,” and given that the division is certainly stronger than, say, 2002, I wouldn’t bet on them to maintain their pace.

So, in sum, don’t panic. It’s a long season. The Twins really should be just fine.

(Oh, and please go get Cliff Lee.  Thanks guys.)

Posted in Uncategorized No Comments Tags: Pythagorean Win Loss

Today in the St. Paul Pioneer Press, Kelsie Smith penned a nice piece raising the question that no one really wants to talk about in light of a certain, large, recently-signed contract:  What’s going on with Joe Mauer?  As Smith notes, the response in the Twins clubhouse is fairly uniform:  Mauer is stinging the ball and tending to hit it right at people.  As Ron Gardenhire put it:

“We could watch video and I could show you probably 25 balls that he’s lined out.  I guarantee, most hitters, you might see 10. Mauer you’d see 25, maybe 30 balls where he’s lined out. Rockets hit at people. It all evens out; that’s what they say. Well, let me tell you, right now, Joe’s got about two weeks of base hits (coming) to even out.”

Anecdotally, this seemed entirely plausible to me, just judging from my own observations.  As it turns out, the numbers do, in fact, back up Gardenhire’s claim. Over Mauer’s career, he has hit just under 23% of all balls in play as line drives. According to The Hardball Times, line drives typically fall in for base hits around 75% of the time – easily the highest percentage among line drives, fly balls and ground balls.  For his career, Mauer’s batting average on all balls hit in play is .342. This year, so far, Mauer is posting a ridiculous line drive percentage of 27.3%, but his average on all balls in play has dropped to .327.  So, despite stinging the ball at a ridiculously high rate – much higher than his career percentage – Mauer is seeing fewer batted balls go for hits.  Gardenhire is right: Mauer is simply smashing the ball right at people  at an absurdly frustrating rate.

Whether or not this means that we’re due to see “two weeks of base hits” is another matter.  Defenses may be playing Mauer differently than in the past, meaning they’re in better position to handle his line drives. Furthermore, it’s rare that a player can sustain a 27% line drive rate. We may see Mauer’s line drive rate drop and his average on balls in play remain rather constant as a result. However, if he can keep hitting the ball as well as he has, there’s no doubt we’ll see that batting average and slugging percentage spike.

Posted in Uncategorized No Comments

In spring training, much was made about Delmon Young reporting to camp 30-35 pounds lighter.  Word was that his attitude had improved as well, and all in all no one seemed the least bit concerned that the Twins’ outfield defense figured to be significantly weakened with Young taking over daily duties in left and Denard Span replacing the offensively inept but defensively stupendous Carlos Gomez.  Young started horribly in 2009 but finished superbly.  Through the end of June, Young had failed to post a wOBA above .290 for any month.  While some speculation was fair that he was being affected by the death of his mother, other speculation was equally fair that the Twins would be lucky if Young ever became a league-average player.   After all, 2009 would see Young eclipse 1800 career plate appearances.  Midway through last season, in my first post on this blog, I wrote that, “At 1600 career at-bats, we may be looking at all we’re going to get with Delmon Young,” and that the Twins would be better off going with Carlos Gomez on a daily basis, even before factoring in Gomez’s vastly superior defense.

Young proceeded to turn his game around; his monthly wOBA from July through September/October was .358, .328, and .375.  That hot finish and the good news regarding Young’s weight and attitude this spring had many fans convinced that Young would finally make good on ancient scouting projections that he would be a star player.  Others, such as myself, were skeptical but naturally hopeful.

From just my own untrained observation, I think it’s fair to say that Young is a different looking player this year.  While he still makes the occasional maddening gaffe in left field, he’s also turned in a few stellar plays that he certainly would not have made with last season’s extra poundage.  So far, Young’s UZR score is a very encouraging 1.3, and his UZR/150 is an acceptable -.6.   Of course, it’s far too early in the season to know whether this is an actual improvement or simply the result of a small sample of plays (UZR scores are typically only deemed “reliable” after three years of data (on this note, if anyone is a regression expert and wants to weigh in, please do)).  Still, my own observation of Young in left coupled with these early statistical returns makes me think he actually has turned a corner defensively.

He has similarly shown improvement on offense.  Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of Young’s game since arriving in Minnesota had been the lack of any sign of power.  His isolated power (ISO) in 2008 was a paltry .115.  In 2009, it was better at .142, but it was still not anywhere close to the .180 or better that you’d want from a power hitter.  This season, Young’s ISO stands at .167, with 3 homers and 4 doubles already and a .423 slugging percentage.  These numbers aren’t spectacular, but they’re extremely encouraging for two reasons.  First, Young is a notoriously slow starter.  If he is to get hot in July and August, we might see some substantial offensive performance from the seventh spot in the order (and from the right side of the plate).  Second, Young’s early numbers have been deflated by bad luck, as his BABIP stands at a mere .250, or 8% less than his career average.  Basically, Young has had an inordinate number of batted balls turn into outs.  He should only see his average on balls in play increase, and when that starts to happen, his other numbers should improve.

Strictly relying on a BABIP turnaround is rather shallow analysis, though, because other factors might reveal that a player is making their own bad luck – they might be swinging at more bad pitches, for instance, or just be making poor contact.  In Young’s case, the first is not true, but the second is.  Young’s plate discipline and bat control are markedly better this year.  He is swinging at 37% of pitches outside the strike zone – a high number, but lower than his career rate of 40%.  He is swinging at 74% of pitches within the strike zone, down from a career rate of 82%.  Most encouragingly, his contact percentage outside the zone has skyrocketed from a career rate of 55% to 70%.  Overall, his swing percentage is 55%, down from his career average of 61%.  All in all, this has translated in a strikeout rate that has plummeted from a career mark of 19.6% to 11.5%, and a walk rate that has more than doubled from 4.2% to 9.1%.  The only part of Young’s game that remains problematic is the quality of his contact.  While he has hit a greater percentage of flyballs than his career percentage, his line drive rate currently sits at 14%, and his groundball rate is 52% – downright ghastly for a power hitter.  In sum, Young’s low BABIP is not due to poor discipline on his part – his early numbers indicate a hitter that is remarkably more selective and patient than in years past.  However, that by itself is not enough to guarantee a big offensive turnaround.  If Young is going to become a good offensive player, he has to start making better contact and hitting more balls in the air.

Overall, the pieces seem to be falling into place for Young, at least so far as the early numbers indicate.  While I’m typically skeptical of such a small sample of numbers, there are reasons to think that these are not simply anomalies of a small sample.  Young is physically in the best shape we’ve ever seen him; the effects have been apparent from watching him run the bases and field flyballs.  Furthermore, his average on balls in play is low enough to think that his numbers should, if anything, improve rather regress, and his reputation as a strong finisher gives further reason for optimism.  Finally, his plate discipline numbers indicate a hitter who has reformed his old bad habits and is waiting for his pitch.  If he can making good on that pitch and change out some of those grounders for liners or flyballs, we might finally see Delmon Young make good on that nebulous “promise” we’ve all been hearing about for two years.

Toolbox: For those curious, I’m including a brief description of the statistics I use and a link to a better explanation.

wOBA:  Basically, this is super-duper-OPS.  It assigns value to a particular offensive event by estimating the run expectancy of the event compared to the run expectancy of making an out.  It was designed to look similar to OBP.  A .330 wOBA is approximately league average.  If you’re curious/skeptical, the top five career wOBA leaders are Babe Ruth, Ted Williams, Lou Gehrig, Rogers Hornsby, and Jimmie Foxx.

UZR:  The estimated runs a player saves on defense, considering range, arm, errors, and ability to turn a double play.  That’s the extent of my understanding, but that’s the gist.

UZR/150:  Basically an estimate of a player’s UZR performance over a 150 game period.

Isolated Power (ISO):  A measure of a player’s raw power, most typically arrived at by subtracting batting average (which does not account for extra bases) from slugging percentage.  This effectively removes all singles from a player’s slugging percentage and thereby “isolates” their power.  There is also a much more complicated way to calculate ISO.

Batting average on balls in play (BABIP):  The percentage of all non-homer fair balls off a player’s bat.  The league average for BABIP is typically around .290-.300.  It is more constant for pitchers than it is for batters (for instance, Joe Mauer’s BABIP is typically above .340, due to his ability to hit line drives, which are much harder to convert into outs than ground balls or flyballs).

Posted in Uncategorized No Comments

It strikes me as rude to use a blog just to tear a journalist down. Typically, I don’t get too annoyed with what paid journalists write, or for that matter, what paid broadcasters say. A lot of times, you can tell that certain professionals parrot the company line, but in all honesty, this is part of their job. A baseball beat writer’s primary concern is getting information out to fans that would otherwise be largely unavailable; as such, sometimes they can’t be sounding the truth trumpet that Orlando Cabrera is a terrible number 2 hitter, or that Ron Gardenhire’s in-game management is at times extraordinarily questionable. These people are paid to do a job. Although I like to think that I generally have an idea of what I’m talking about, I blog part time while I go to school all the time.* As such, I try not to question reporters and beat writers too much, but would rather give them the benefit of the doubt on their decisions about what to report and how to report it.

Columnists have a different job than beat writers. Their job is to offer perspective – sometimes unpopular perspective. There is immense value in such an endeavor, and it would strike just about anyone as a gross violation of “freedom of the press” to say that a columnist should censor his or her opinions on account of offending or upsetting people.

While columnists have an admirable job to do and should do so fearlessly, they should also do so responsibly. Offering opinions merely to get attention moves opinion out of the sacred halls of dynamic journalism into the burlesque of cheap tricks. Unfortunately, the fury of discussion surrounding the possibility of trading Joe Mauer has been launched by nothing more than a sham story by our very own Jim Souhan.

Ever since Souhan penned his piece, the speculation regarding a possible Mauer trade has been rampant. (Seriously, look at how many of those articles link back just to Souhan’s article.) I’m all for discussing options and debating whether or not it’s advantageous to keep Mauer. In fact, that story was already published by Souhan’s employer, and it was a valid, well-written story.

This brings me to my first problem with Souhan’s piece. While it has launched a fresh wave of discussion, its perspective is decidedly stale.  This isn’t anything Twins fans haven’t been thinking in one form or another ever since it became apparent last year that Mauer was going to own the greatest season by a catcher in the history of the universe. The gist of the point about possibly trading Mauer is this:  “If Mauer doesn’t sign, he might leave as a free agent.  If he leaves as a free agent, all the Twins get back is two measly draft picks. They would probably have to trade him to get maximum value back.”  Duh.  We’ve been there.  We’ve done that.

But hey, maybe there’s some new wrinkle in the story.  It’s quite possible that Souhan has inside information that warrants opening up the discussion again.  That’s good reporting.  And hey, if they have to trade him, people should talk about it and see what they expect back from losing their beloved super-duper-star.

This brings me to my second problem with the piece:  it makes suggestions that are entirely unfounded, unless of course you just trust Souhan’s word rather than loads of evidence suggesting that there’s not much more to this story than idle speculation.  Think about it.  Souhan could have written a glowing column about how great life will be when these deliberate, careful, and fair negotiations finally result in a long contract for one of baseball’s best two players. And that column would have been based on as much fact (aside from a passing reference to conversation with a variety of people) and new news as the one he ended up writing. But of course, this column generates more buzz and gets yourself linked all over the internet, so hey, why not**?

This brings me to my third problem with this piece:  it is misleadingly narrow in its focus.  In both his column about trading Mauer and another column just written this morning, Souhan has made the claim that the Twins have offered around $20 million per year and that Mauer is cool to this number.  Of course, this is based on the always ambiguous “talking with a variety of people,” not far from the lovely hot stove “source close with the club” that yields a reliable story about one time in every fifty reports. And of course, this number doesn’t take into account that number of years could well be holding up the talks more than just the average yearly salary.

Finally, my biggest problem with this piece was that, other than “talks with a variety of people,” there is absolutely no concrete evidence demonstrating that talks are going badly other than speculation that this deal would have been done sooner. In fact, all available evidence suggests, at the very least, the talks are not going badly. Everyone remembers the Santana debacle. By the middle of winter, it was crystal clear that the sides would not be able to agree, and the Twins immediately began shopping Santana.  ESPN’s hot stove immediately incinerated, rumors flew from multiple sources, and the trade ended up happening well-before spring training, in part because of Santana’s self-imposed deadline to get a deal done, and in part because of the humongous distraction the situation would cause in spring training. The Twins had every bit as much reason to keep those problems quiet, but the bottom line is that when things go badly, teams hear about it and start talking.  We have had none of that.

The situation today is entirely similar and entirely different. Santana and Mauer are both once-in-a-generation talents.  Santana was in his prime; Mauer is just entering his prime.  Both situations involve the player’s contract year.  In both situations, the Twins realistically can’t afford to let the player walk at the end of the year for two draft picks.  It is simply unimaginable that the Twins plan on going through a full season with the Mauer distraction, only to lose him for a pittance at the end of the year, so if talks have really stalled, one would think they would be looking at a trade.  There has been no indication from any source, other than Souhan, that these talks have stalled and the Twins might be forced to look into trading Mauer. It is just not believable that there is any problem with these talks other than that they might be going slowly.

Furthermore, the story overlooks the overall context of the Twins’ situation. Going into the offseason, Mauer stated that he would let the contract happen when it happened, and that he did not want to rush the Twins into signing him; he was perfectly happy to let them get other business in order before negotiating a contract.  The Twins, for their part, are notoriously slow negotiators who have been reported to be gun shy about signing free agents long term because of Mauer’s looming contract.  They seemingly take such a deliberate approach in an effort to maximize value; they allow the market to determine appropriate prices for players, and then they pounce when they can get the price they want.  Look no farther than the Thome and Hudson signings this winter.  What we can reasonably infer from these factors is:

1) The Twins have taken care of other business before signing Mauer by trading for JJ Hardy, re-signing Carl Pavano, signing Jim Thome and Orlando Hudson, taking care of contracts for all arbitration-eligible players, and buying out arbitration for Nick Blackburn and Denard Span.  It’s not like the Twins have devoted 4 months entirely to Joe Mauer.

2) The Twins, at least for my money, seem to be locking down long-term costs by buying out arbitration of key players before they sign Mauer. This makes sense because they have been reported as being concerned with their long-term budget because of Mauer’s upcoming contract extension.

3) Given how slowly the Twins typically negotiate (Crede and Kyle Gibson last year, Hudson and Thome this year), it really is not that surprising that talks revolving around what will be the biggest contract in team history (and one of the biggest in baseball) have been drawn out.

What is really unfortunate is that the Twins and Mauer have seemingly done everything they can to keep this situation from becoming a distraction.  This of course does not mean that people can’t talk about what kind of contract would be appropriate, or what type of return the Twins should expect if they end up having to trade Mauer.  (To this point, Souhan’s suggestion that the Twins trade for a closer is laughably short sighted.)  But when the most visible sports columnist in the Twin Cities’ largest newspaper starts dropping hints that the time might be right to trade Mauer because talks are apparently not going well, seemingly based on little more than casual speculation and despite significant evidence to the contrary, it’s time to call him on it and move the discussion along.

Posted in Uncategorized 6 Comments Tags: Jim Souhan, Joe Mauer, Rants

The word from LaVelle E. Neal of the Star Tribune is that the Twins have, in fact, offered Jarrod Washburn a one year deal worth $5 million.  During the 2008 season, the Twins were rumored to be interested in acquiring Washburn from the Seattle Mariners, but, when the Mariners’ asking price was too high, the Twins backed off.  Now, at least, it seems that Washburn is doing what the Mariners did in 2008:  saving the Twins from themselves.  The bottom line is that, on its face, this is a highly questionable move by a front office that had seemed to be moving in the right direction since the 2009 trade deadline.  The problems with Washburn have been well-documented, but this story worked me into such a lather that I can’t help myself.

Washburn originally started his career with the Angels.  He had a breakout year in 2002, hurling 206 innings while going 18-6 with a 3.15 ERA.  He compiled 139 strikeouts and walked only 59 batters, leading to a 3.71 FIP that suggested that, while he wasn’t quite as good as a 3.15 ERA, it wasn’t a totally ridiculous result of Washburn’s performance.  Unfortunately, other than his very successful 2002 campaign, Washburn has never posted a FIP lower than 4.35, and has a career 4.60 FIP, which means that, all things being equal (fair defense, fair luck, fair home run rate), you can expect Washburn to give you an ERA between 4.40 and 4.80.  Definitely, a club could do worse.

The problem with Washburn is that he is extremely reliant on his defense.  Striking out a modest 5.33 batters per nine innings, Washburn also walks 2.75 batters per nine innings; basically, for every two strikeouts Washburn notches, he shoots himself in the foot with a walk.  Given those ratios, his defense has to be crisp for him to be effective.  Witness the first half of his season last year in Seattle, where, playing in front of one of the best defenses imaginable, Washburn posted a glistening 2.64 ERA.  The importance of defense to Washburn is doubly important because he gives up a hefty amount of line drives (20% of all balls in play) and a fair amount of fly balls (42% of all balls in play).  Basically, almost 2/3 of the time a batter puts a ball in play, it’s in the air and quite possibly hit pretty hard.  Without a good defense, Washburn is going to be very susceptible to having a lot of men on base and possibly giving up a lot of extra base hits.

This isn’t to say he’s worthless.  His career 4.60 FIP is nothing to be ashamed of, especially considering the fact that Washburn routinely throws 150-190 innings.  Also, Seattle shows that, given the right circumstances, he can be very successful.  With someone like Franklin “Death to Flying Things” Gutierrez prowling center field, a team could make the most of Washburn’s talents.  The Twins are not a team like that.  With Carlos Gomez gone to Milwaukee and Denard Span moved to center field, the Twins’ defense in center figures to be a bit worse than it was last year.  Delmon Young and Michael Cuddyer are just plain poor in the corners.  Both have cannons for arms, but neither can cover much ground.  Contrary to what happened in Seattle, Washburn signing on with the Twins would make his weaknesses glaringly apparent.  Factor in the fact that he’s 35 and unlikely to see a sudden improvement in skills, and it’s hard to see why the Twins are making the offer they are.

There are, of course, circumstances that could make the Twins’ interest a bit more understandable.  With a Washburn signing, the Twins would have a glut of potential starters and would seem even more likely to deal one of their arms, perhaps for a third baseman or second baseman.  Absent such a deal (and there has been little indication that such a trade may be imminent), the move just does not make sense.  Neal noted in his initial Washburn post that a Twins official commented that Brian Duensing might be better now than Washburn is.  In that case, offering five million dollars for a pitcher of comparable abilities to an in-house option is just inexplicable.  There have been indications that the Twins don’t want to rely on inexperienced starters in the event that one of their pitchers goes down this year (like Slowey and Perkins did last year, leading to a parade of Anthony Swarzak, Jeff Manship, R.A. Dickey, an ineffective Francisco Liriano, and finally Duensing).  Fair enough, but this reasoning is hard to rationalize when you consider that the Twins really have NO option at third base or second base, depending on where Nick Punto plays.

While having a contingent plan for pitchers is nice and all, addressing a gaping hole is a higher priority.   (Note:  I have expressed optimism about Danny Valencia, but I think it’s fair to assume he’s not going to be ready right out of spring training.) There have been ample opportunities to address third base:  Troy Glaus, Placido Polanco, and Mark DeRosa have all signed for extremely reasonable salaries (Glaus signing for a surprisingly low $2.5 million, Polanco getting a nice three-year deal, and DeRosa getting an absolutely fair and reasonable deal from the Giants).  It’s very hard to understand why the Twins would continue to let such reasonably-priced options sign with other clubs and focus instead on paying $5 million for an aging pitcher who might be a nice safety net, but is not absolutely necessary.

Posted in Uncategorized 4 Comments Tags: Jarrod Washburn, Rants

The Twins will tender contracts to all 30 unsigned players on the 40 man roster.  Some of those names aren’t surprising; the Twins clearly weren’t going to give up on Delmon Young after his monster September and the Carlos Gomez trade.  Brendan Harris, despite maybe not being in the manager’s favor, is plenty valuable as a bench bat/utility player.  I’m also not surprised that the Twins are bringing back Matt Guerrier and Francisco Liriano.  What is somewhat surprising, however, is that they tendered Jesse Crain. Crain certainly showed a lot of promise toward the end of last year, but the fact remains that the bullpen is crowded.  The following pitchers certainly have entrenched roles with the club:

Starters:  Scott Baker, Kevin Slowey, Carl Pavano, Nick Blackburn

Relievers:  Joe Nathan, Jose Mijares, Matt Guerrier, Jon Rauch, Jesse Crain

The Twins also have a number of pitchers who certainly have, at one time or another, showed potential to be a big league contributor:

Starters:  Brian Duensing, Anthony Swarzak, Francisco Liriano, Glen Perkins

Relievers:  Pat Neshek, Jeff Manship (not quite sure where to put him.)

And finally, the Twins have Anthony Slama and Rob Delaney in the minors, two pitchers who have put up very solid relief numbers and certainly could be ready to pitch in the big leagues this year.  In all, the Twins have two or three spots to be had amongst 8 pitchers who probably would get a shot with a major league club in the near future (four starters for one spot; four relievers and four starters for two or three bullpen spots).   Consider also that the Twins have stocked up on pitchers from the last draft, and it seems like this club has quite the stash of capable/promising young arms.

After the conclusion of the winter meetings, popular speculation was that the Twins very well could be done making any big moves.  With the Pavano signing, the Hardy trade, arbitration to a number of players, and the looming Joe Mauer extension, the Twins look like they may be taking on a $90+ million payroll next year.  Further, the free agent options are looking expensive; reports are that Adrian Beltre is seeking a 5 year, $65 million contract, and that Mark DeRosa is looking for 3 years at $27 million.  The market also may push Beltre’s and DeRosa’s demands back down to earth.  However, it certainly looks unlikely that the Twins will be offering up the kind of moneythat would push next year’s payroll near $100 million (not that I’d be upset about this).

The speculation here is that the Twins are looking to make a trade.  This isn’t based on some insider tip; it just seems to me that the Twins have such a surplus of young pitching that at least a few arms are expendable.  Given that most teams are always looking for pitching, why wouldn’t the Twins be looking to include these guys in a deal?  Thoughts?

Posted in Roster 2 Comments

The word in the Twins’ blogotwittersphere (mainly via LaVelle E. Neal III) is that Carl Pavano will accept the Twins’ offer of arbitration and return with the club next season.  Ed Price of FanHouse.com reports that Pavano could make $7 million or more.  This is not all that surprising given that Pavano is still fighting the stigma of 4 lost years in hell…er…New York and has expressed a desire to return to the Twins.

When the Twins acquired Pavano last year, too many observations focused on his bloated ERA.  Of course, focus on ERA ignores the fact that Pavano had inordinately bad luck pitching in Cleveland as Cleveland’s defensive efficiency was well-below league average.  For his career, Pavano has a 4.44 ERA and a 4.17 FIP; his poor ERA last year undoubtedly has inflated his career total.  He showed down the stretch last year and in the post season that he has good enough stuff to make an impact for the Twins.  The biggest issue of course is his health, but by accepting arbitration and signing a one year contract, this risk is practically neutralized for the Twins.

Pavano is an effective if unspectacular pitcher.  Last year he struck out 6.64 batters per nine innings while walking only 1.76 batters per nine for a very solid 3.77 K/BB ratio.  On a club that has many flyball-prone pitchers, Pavano actually induces many more ground balls than flyballs, which keeps his home run totals reasonable despite having a rather hefty 10% of all flyballs leave the park.  Perhaps most importantly, he pitched nearly 200 innings and did not show any signs of injury problems, other than slight fatigue as he approached 200 innings.  In short, if the Twins get what they’re hoping for, they’ll probably get 180-200 innings of of 3.9-4.5 ERA pitching with about 20 or so home runs surrendered, good control and a modest strikeout rate.  Pavano should be helped by the addition of JJ Hardy at short more than most Twins pitchers due to his high groundball/flyball ratio.

So far, so good for the Twins this offseason.  They’ve unclogged the outfield jam, upgraded at shortstop, and signed a quality veteran pitcher. Getting a quality “ace” caliber pitcher would be ideal, but at this point it’s probably more reasonable for fans to hope for an Adrian Beltre, Felipe Lopez or Orlando Hudson signing.  (Of course, I won’t fault anyone for dreaming of a trade for Josh Johnson.)  As I’ve stated, my preference is Hudson; his solid OBP would probably be more valuable to the Twins than most, given that he’d undoubtedly be hitting between OBP machine Denard Span and in front of one of the top hitters in the American League, Joe Mauer.

In short, the Pavano signing is a good, solid, but unexciting move for the Twins.  They solidify their rotation with a quality arm at a marginal risk for next year. Yet to be done:  acquire a second or third baseman, sign Mauer, and see if there is a big splash to be made.

Posted in Uncategorized No Comments

Matthew Pouliot of the excellent Circling the Bases baseball blog is reporting a list of type A free agents, and whether they’ve been offered arbitration or not.  Of significant interest to Twins fans should be the fact that neither Placido Polanco nor Orlando Hudson were offered arbitration, meaning the Twins will not be forced to forfeit a draft pick if they sign either player.  The preference here would be for the Twins to go after Hudson and his excellent ability to get on base; this would give the Twins a legitimate option to bat second in the batting order in front of AL MVP Joe Mauer.  Polanco wouldn’t be a bad pickup by any means, however.  Where Hudson would bring an offensive table setter with average-to-subpar defense, Polanco would bring less offensive abilities but more defensive value, based on their numbers last year.  Either option would go a long way toward solidifying the infield and rounding out the batting order.  The Twins should get on it immediately.

Posted in Uncategorized No Comments Tags: Orlando Hudson, Placido Polanco

Various sources are reporting that Joe Mauer has been named MVP of the American League, receiving 27 of 28 possible first place votes.  The other first-place vote went to Miguel Cabrera of Detroit.  Mark Teixera finished second, with teammate Derek Jeter third; Cabrera finished fourth.  Really, this award is no surprise.  Mauer led the AL in average, OBP and SLG.  No one since George Brett in 1980 has done that, and Mauer did it playing elite defense at the most premium defensive position.  Some arguments were made that the MVP should not go to someone who missed the first month of the season, but it’s worth noting that Mauer still played in an exceptional number of games for a catcher, as he played in 138 of his 141 games while not on the disabled list (granted, some of those at DH).  In short, Mauer was magnificent.  He put on an offensive performance for the ages, was the best player in baseball (at least this side of Albert Pujols), and was an iron man even considering the time he missed in April.  Thankfully, the Twins managed to sneak into the playoffs, which aptly illustrated how valuable Mauer is; without him, the Twins would not have even been sniffing the playoffs.  That value would be the same on the Yankees or the Royals, but it was plainly apparent given the Twins’ fortunes this year.  Congratulations, Joe Mauer.  We were all pulling for you.

Posted in Uncategorized No Comments